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III. Introduction
In the United States, publicly-held companies are required to present their financial
statements according to a set of accounting standards and rules known as Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP. A company’s management has responsibility
for preparing the company’s financial statements. The role of independent certified public
accountants, auditors, is to audit the financial statements and render an opinion as to
whether the financial statements are fairly stated and comply in all material respects with
GAAP. The auditor’s report, which communicates the auditor’s opinion, has been criticized
for being a pass/fail report that has little communicative value (PCAOB Open Board
Meeting, 2016).
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which sets standards
for audit procedures and reporting practices, regulates auditors of publicly-held companies.
The PCAOB is currently considering a proposal to expand the auditor’s report from the
standardized one page report to a more in-depth discussion by the auditor about matters that
pertain directly to the company. The expansion would remedy the formulaic language of
audit reports, introduce critical audit matters (CAMs) in the report, and require the auditor
to disclose his or her tenure in the report (PCAOB Open Board Meeting, 2016).
The PCAOB proposal comes at a relevant time because the United Kingdom
recently adopted an expanded auditor’s report. In 2013, the Financial Reporting Council of
the United Kingdom (FRC) adopted new standards for the auditor’s report in the UK. The
change in standards came in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which left
investors feeling blindsided by numerous bankruptcies where audits were seen to fail to give
warning of imminent collapse (House of Lords, 2011). The new reports in the UK allow
auditors to take a more free-form approach to writing the auditor’s report, thus doing away
5

with formulaic language (PCAOB White Paper, 2016). The new standard also requires
auditors to identify key audit matters and to report risks of material misstatement, as well as
describe how the audit scope addressed those risks. For the remainder of the paper, the
term CAMs will be used to describe both key audit matters (the term adopted in the UK)
and critical audit matters (the term proposed in the US).
This paper will examine whether the expanded auditor’s reports provide additional
information beyond what management discusses in Management Discussion and Analysis
and footnotes to the financial statements by performing a qualitative analysis of the
information provided in the expanded auditor’s reports of four major UK grocery store
chains both before and after the adoption of the new standard. This paper also examines
whether the reported CAMs change from year to year. The results of the paper should be
useful to policymakers in the US as they decide whether or not to adopt an expanded
auditor’s report similar to the one now required in the UK. In my analysis I find that the
external auditor is frequently reporting on CAMs that are already being reported by
management, and therefore already communicated to investors, suggesting little to no added
value in the expanded auditor’s report. However, it also may suggest that what the auditor
reports influences what management reports, which could provide added value for investors.
In the next section, I review the history of audit reporting standards in the US and
the UK, explain the PCAOB proposal, and survey academic research on this subject. In the
sections following the introduction, I will explain the procedures and results of my
qualitative analysis.
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IV. Background

A. History
In the 1800s audit reports were extremely brief, often 50 words or fewer (Chalmers,
et al., 2015). This audit report was often referred to as a certificate, wherein the auditor
certified some level of fairness, trueness, or correctness of the financial statements (Church,
et al., 2008). These reports were generally non-standardized, and investors were left to their
own devices to determine the level of assurance provided by the auditor (Brown, et al.). The
auditor’s report saw its first element of standardization in 1934 when the New York Stock
Exchange issued regulations requiring audit reports to include a scope and an opinion
paragraph (Brown, et al.). The scope paragraph explained what the audit entailed and the
opinion stated whether the company followed generally established accounting principles
(Church, et al., 2008). Standardization was meant to aid users in identifying non-standard
audit reports (Brown, et al.). The phrase “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP)
was introduced for the first time in 1939 (Geiger, 1993).
For the next 60 years, the auditor’s report was essentially unchanged, with minor
exceptions. During this period, changes to the auditor’s report focused mainly on the
wording of the reports, as well as guidance on reporting on non-standard issues (Brown, et
al.). The wording of the reports expanded to include explanations of the audit process, as
well as explicit recognition of the auditor’s reporting responsibilities (Church, et al., 2008).
Standard reports received an unqualified opinion, meaning no material errors were detected
by the audit. Non-standard reports included qualified opinions, meaning isolated material
errors exist in the financial statements; disclaimers of opinion, meaning the auditor gave no
opinion because the audit lacked enough evidence; and adverse opinions, meaning the
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auditor identified multiple or significant material errors or misstatements, which are rare
because auditors generally communicate large errors to management to correct so that they
can then issue an unqualified or qualified opinion (Church, et al., 2008).
Accounting scandals in the early 2000s, such as Enron and WorldCom, caused
investors to lose trust in auditors and in the credibility of the auditor’s report. As a result,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which in turn created the PCAOB, and
further standardized the auditor’s report. The new standards required auditors to give an
opinion on both the fairness of the financial statements and on internal control over
financial reporting, including a description of any identified material weaknesses (Church, et
al., 2008). Critics argued that the enhanced structure of the auditor’s report changed the
nature of what the auditor’s report stands for (Church, et al., 2008). Although the auditor’s
report is meant to be a communication tool, the emphasis on standard language caused the
auditor’s report to transform into a symbol of the auditor’s work or reputation, as opposed
to an informative document for users of financial statements (Church, et al., 2008). As a
result, there have been requests in recent years for the PCAOB to reexamine the purpose of
the auditor’s report and how it can be used to communicate more effectively to investors.
The auditor’s report in the United Kingdom followed a similar trajectory to that of
the US, until recently. The rule-making body in the UK is the Financial Reporting Council,
or FRC. Whereas the PCAOB issues Auditing Standards, commonly referred to as AS’s, the
FRC issues International Standards on Auditing, or ISAs. The ISA that is of particular
interest is ISA (UK) 700 because this is the standard that expanded the auditor’s report in
the UK as of 2013. Another standard-setting board, the International Auditing and
Assurance Standards Board, or IAASB, also issues ISAs, which explains why “UK” is in
parentheses for those ISAs issued by the FRC. However, I will refer to the UK standard,
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ISA (UK) 700, as ISA 700 for simplicity. Throughout my analysis, I refer to the years prior
to and including 2013, before the expanded auditor’s report was included in annual reports,
as the pre-ISA 700 period. The post-ISA 700 period refers to the years after 2013, when the
expanded auditor’s report came into practice.
ISA 700 dramatically changes the auditor’s report in a few key ways. First, it allows
the auditor to take a more free-form approach to writing the report, as opposed to following
a standard outline. Second, it requires auditors to explicitly identify CAMs and risks of
material misstatement. Third, it requires auditors to describe how the scope of the audit and
the determined level of materiality addressed CAMs and risks of material misstatement
(Financial Reporting Council, June, 2016). In a summary analysis regarding the evolution of
the auditor’s report published by PricewaterhouseCoopers, an accounting firm that provides
auditing services throughout the world including the UK, the authors succinctly describe
some of their perceived benefits of the expanded auditor’s report:
“Our opinion is now less than a tenth of the overall report. We now describe the
risks of material misstatement that had the greatest effect on our audit and how we
addressed those risks. We highlight where we performed our work, and why, both
from a geographic and company structure perspective. We describe the materiality
we used to help us determine the scope of our audit and to evaluate misstatements.”
An important element of the expanded report is that because auditors can write freely about
specific events and circumstances in both the macro and micro environment affecting the
company in the year under audit, stakeholders can more easily determine the identity of the
company – even if the name of the company were to be covered up (Chalmers, et al., 2015).
The authors shared with readers that “some shareholders have told [them] that the audit
report is the first thing they turn to in the Annual Report (Chalmers, et al., 2015).” This
speaks to the value of the audit report to shareholders, investors, and other users, and to the
credibility of the auditor’s opinion.
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In January 2016 the FRC released a report reviewing the successes and shortcomings
of the expanded auditor’s report thus far. In the summary for investors, the FRC reports
auditors have succeeded in moving away from “generic language and descriptions of risk,
making their reports more relevant and insightful (Financial Reporting Council, January,
2017).” Investors especially appreciate the ease of following the new structure, due to the
deliberate use of signposting, graphics, diagrams and color. However, investors still have
requests for what they see lacking in the reports, including more information about
sensitivity ranges used in audit testing; greater insight into the auditor’s assessment of
internal controls; and explicitness about the auditor’s view on the appropriateness of
management estimates (Financial Reporting Council, January, 2017). Overall, it appears that
there was some value added – at least in the appearance and the ease of reading the auditor’s
report – yet investors are still lacking some of the information that they were hoping to
receive.

B. PCAOB Proposal
In response to concerns of investors and other financial statement users that the
auditor’s report could be more informative and a better communicative tool, the PCAOB
began outreach in 2010 on possible changes to the auditor's report (PCAOB Release 2011003, June 21, 2011). This effort led to a Concept Release in 2011, followed by the issuance
of a Proposed Rule in 2013 and a Reproposed Rule in 2016. As of March 2017, the PCAOB
is drafting a release for Board action. This section and Exhibit 1 outline the timeline and
main points of the PCAOB’s standard-setting project on the auditor’s reporting model.
On June 21, 2011 the PCAOB issued a Concept Release to address alternatives for
changing the auditor’s reporting model. The Concept Release came in response to concerns
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of investors and other financial statement users that the auditor’s report could be more
informative and generally a better communicative tool than it is currently (PCAOB Release
2011-003, June 21, 2011). The Concept Release presented a number of alternatives for
investors, financial statement preparers, auditors, audit committee members, and others to
respond to with comments and questions, in order for the PCAOB to develop a formal
proposal (PCAOB Release 2011-003, June 21, 2011). Among the alternatives discussed in
the Concept Release were the addition of an Auditor’s Discussion and Analysis; required use
of emphasis paragraphs; auditor reporting on information outside the financial statements;
and clarification of certain language in the auditor’s report (PCAOB Release 2011-003, June
21, 2011). The Concept Release was used to solicit public comment about the alternatives,
as well as to invite interested parties to join a public roundtable, held on September 15, 2011,
to discuss the alternatives (PCAOB Release 2011-003, June 21, 2011).
Following the Concept Release, roundtable, and solicitation of comments, the
PCAOB released the first version of the Proposed Rule on August 13, 2013. This proposal
explains that investors believe that auditors gain knowledge during the audit that is not
known to investors that might assist them in making investment decisions (PCAOB Release
2013-005, August 13, 2013). The PCAOB goes on to explain that the auditor’s report has
remained largely unchanged in the U.S. since the 1940s, yet the report is undergoing change
globally (PCAOB Release 2013-005, August 13, 2013). This first version of the proposal
included three significant changes to the existing auditor’s report, including reporting critical
audit matters; adding elements related to auditor independence, tenure, and responsibilities
for other information; and enhancing certain standardized language (PCAOB Release 2013005, August 13, 2013). These proposed standards are meant to increase the informational
value of the auditor’s report without placing an undue burden on the financial reporting
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process (PCAOB Release 2013-005, August 13, 2013). Following the release of this initial
proposal, the PCAOB hosted Standing Advisory Group meetings, Investor Advisory Group
meetings, and a public meeting on the auditor’s reporting model between November of 2013
and October of 2014 to invite further comments and prepare revisions for the proposed rule
(PCAOB Release 2013-005, August 13, 2013).
In response to the meetings and additional commentary from investors, financial
statement preparers, auditors, audit committee members, and other users of financial
statements, the PCAOB released a Reproposed Rule on May 11, 2016. Although this latest
proposal retains the pass/fail nature of the auditor’s report, it introduces significant changes
as well (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). These changes include (1) determining,
communicating, and documenting critical audit matters; (2) clarifying the auditor’s role and
responsibilities, specifically with regards to independence, tenure, and addressee; (3) adding
explanatory language and emphasis paragraphs; (4) including information about certain audit
participants; and (5) clarifying the form of the auditor’s report (PCAOB Release 2016-003,
May 11, 2016).
The first element of the reproposal related to critical audit matters (CAMs) required
the most attention, particularly with regards to defining a CAM because the definition
changed moderately from the 2013 proposal (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).
CAMs are defined as those matters that were communicated or were required to be
communicated to the audit committee; that relate to accounts or disclosures that are material
to the financial statements; and that involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex
auditor judgment (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).
The second element which clarifies the auditor’s role and responsibilities includes the
addition of an independence statement to enhance financial statement users’ understanding
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of the auditor’s existing obligation to be independent, and serves as a reminder to the auditor
of this obligation (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). Further, the PCAOB proposes
to make it uniform that the auditor addresses shareholders and the board of directors, with
the option to include other addressees (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). In
addition, the PCAOB proposes that auditor tenure be disclosed. However, the Board is also
seeking comment on whether auditor tenure would be more appropriate on the recently
adopted Form AP, Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants (PCAOB Release 2016-003,
May 11, 2016).
The third element of the reproposed standard provides examples of potential matters
that the auditor may choose to emphasize in the auditor's report. These additional emphasis
paragraphs may be used when there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to
continue as a going concern or in the event of a restatement of previously issued financial
statements (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). The auditor may also decide to
emphasize other matters in the financial statements or use additional explanatory language if
the auditor determines it is appropriate to do so.
The fourth element of inclusion of information about certain audit participants is
optional under the reproposed standard (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). The
purpose of this element is to incorporate a new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
amendment that requires firms to disclose engagement partners and other accounting firms
on Form AP, with the choice of also disclosing this information in the auditor’s report
(PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). The reproposed standard does not include a
specific location for this disclosure (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).
Finally, the fifth element related to the form of the auditor’s report offers auditors
more flexibility in presentation (PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016). The reproposed

13

rule would require the “Opinion on the Financial Statements” section to be the first section
of the auditor's report, immediately followed by the “Basis for Opinion” section, but the
other sections – including CAMs and explanatory paragraphs – would have no specific order
(PCAOB Release 2016-003, May 11, 2016).

C. Academic Research
Various researchers have come to a number of conclusions about whether or not
the expanded auditor’s report is more informative than reports of the past. Marcus M.
Doxey found that auditor disclosures regarding management estimates increase the
transparency and value-relevance of the audit report (Doxey, 2014). Doxey used MBA
students from a major land-grant university in the US as participants in the experiment. In
Doxey’s experiment he gave participants auditor’s reports for different companies, all of
which received unqualified opinions (passing assessments), and asked them to decide how
much they would invest in each company. He found that participants’ evaluation of
management was generally intuitive, whereas evaluation of auditor independence was
unintuitive. Participants reduced their investments in companies in which they perceived
aggressive reporting choices by management, such as those related to estimates. This is
intuitive because participants may suspect that aggressive reporting choices indicate
management bias or attempted earnings management, so they are unlikely to find those
choices reliable.
However, subjects rated auditors who agreed with management as more independent
than those who publicly disagree (Doxey, 2014). Standard-setters may anticipate the
opposite to happen – that auditors who disagree with management would be seen as more
independent – but given an unqualified opinion, disagreement seems to violate users’
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expectations of the auditor’s view of the fairness of the financial statements. Some auditors
have voiced concern that users may misinterpret additions to an expanded auditor’s report,
and Doxey’s finding may support that concern. However, Doxey also found that expanding
audit disclosures to include the auditor’s views on estimates actually reduces user’s views of
the level of assurance provided by an audit. Often users believe an audit provides absolute
assurance when in fact auditors are required only to provide reasonable assurance (Louwers,
et al., 2015). This finding suggests that an expanded report adds value in that it reduces the
expectations gap and clarifies the position of the auditor.
Lennox, Schmidt, and Thompson also tackle the question of whether the expanded
UK audit report is more informative to users. Consistent with my hypothesis of US
reporting, they find that in prior annual reports management has already disclosed many
risks of material misstatement (RMMs) that the auditor is now required to report as CAMs
(Lennox, et al., 2016). The researchers found that only 20% of the auditor risk disclosures
were potentially new in the first year of the expanded report. They add that many times
management is disclosing these risks outside of the annual reports, such as through
conference calls. Additionally, they find that users do not find these disclosures to be
incrementally informative. Market reactions were insignificant for small companies,
companies with low analyst followings, and companies with low ownership by large
shareholders (Lennox, et al., 2016).
Another concern with the additional risk disclosures is that the RMMs reported by
the auditor may have been relevant to the interim financial statements, yet are irrelevant to
the audited financial statements. This could explain why market reactions are insignificant or
why investors do not find the disclosures to be incrementally informative, either because the
RMMs were eliminated during the audit by performing extended audit procedures or
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because investors already knew about the risks before the expanded auditor reports were
introduced (Lennox, et al., 2016). However, it can be argued that disclosure by an auditor is
more credible than disclosure by management, thus adding value to the risk disclosures
(Lennox, et al., 2016).
Smith also found little evidence that markets had an observable response to the
introduction of the expanded audit reports, although she found that the readability and the
tone of the reports changed. Other researchers rated audit reports in the pre-ISA 700 period
to be “very difficult” and even “inhibitive” in effectively communicating audit results to
financial statement users (Smith, 2016). On the FOG scale1 that Smith uses, audit reports
required more years of formal education for user comprehension than Form 10-Ks and Wall
Street Journal articles. However, in the post-ISA 700 period users require five fewer years of
formal education to comprehend the reports as compared to comprehending the pre-ISA
700 reports (Smith, 2016). These findings suggest that expanded audit reports are more
accessible to users because the language has changed in a way that makes them easier to
read, suggesting that boilerplate language is indeed changing.
As for tone, Smith found the post-ISA 700 reports to include more negative words,
which could be explained by auditors disclosing more RMMs and detailing the impact of
those risks on the scope of the audit. Additionally, she found that there was a higher rate of
all tone related words (positive, negative, and uncertain), suggesting that additional
disclosures were not standard in nature but in fact potentially added value to the reports
(Smith, 2016).

The Fog Index (FOG) is a widely used readability statistic developed by Robert Gunning (Gunning ,1952) that
evaluates the number of words in a sentence and the percentage of complex words (words with three syllables
or more) to estimate the number of formal years of education an average person would need to read and
comprehend the text. The higher the measure the more complex the text.
1
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Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski examine the potential of the proposal to increase
auditor liability and subsequent litigation (Gimbar, et al., December 2015). They review five
experiments that address this question and identify patterns in the research. They
differentiate between related CAMs (those that specifically relate to litigated issues) and
unrelated CAMs (those that discuss high-risk accounting issues that are different from the
accounting issues identified in litigation). Although they identify a variety of conclusions
among the five experiments, preliminary evidence indicates that legal liability is either
reduced or unchanged when a related CAM is included in the audit report, subject to two
notable exceptions. First, a related CAM for which audit procedures are also described in
the report tends to increase perception of auditor liability, as well as foreseeability of the
misstatement (Backof, 2014). Second, a CAM is associated with higher perception of auditor
liability when the related accounting standard is precise (rules-based) as opposed to less
precise (principles-based) (Gimbar, et al., August 2015).
Gimbar, et al. note that the results about unrelated CAMs are mixed and less
conclusive than the results for related CAMs (Gimbar, et al., December 2015). Because
unrelated CAMs do not serve as disclaimers in the way that related CAMs do, some
experiments concluded that they increased perception of auditor liability (Gimbar, et al.,
December 2015). However, other researchers found that inclusion of a CAM had no effect
on this perception, and one experiment found that an unrelated CAM actually reduced the
perception of auditor liability when compared to situations where the auditor explicitly
disclosed that no CAMs were identified in the audit (Brasel, et al.). Gimbar, et al. noted
some limitations with their examination of the five experiments, including the fact that the
experiments engage four different participant pools, which could explain much of the
variation in results (Gimbar, et al., December 2015). In addition, they raise the questions of
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how precision of the audit standards influences auditor liability perception, and whether
clarifying language about the audit procedures could interact with CAM disclosures (Gimbar,
et al., December 2015).
In a second paper, Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski perform their own experiment
related to the similarities between imprecise standards and CAMs (Gimbar, et al., August
2015). Using students enrolled in introductory accounting courses to model jurors, they
introduce a scenario in which “a large pension fund investor alleges that the auditor allowed
the company’s equipment leases to be inappropriately classified as operating instead of
capital.” They note that “lease classification is an ideal setting in which to examine precise
and imprecise standards, as bright-line thresholds exist in the precise environment, while
judgment is more clearly required when imprecise standards are applied.”
They find that imprecise standards require greater auditor judgment and skill and
therefore increase auditor liability, whereas precise standards constrain auditor control over
financial reporting outcomes and therefore decrease auditor liability (Gimbar, et al., August
2015). However, when a related CAM is disclosed under precise standards jurors perceive
auditors to have a causal role in and an ability to foresee an audit failure because like
imprecise standards, related CAMs require greater auditor judgment and skill (Gimbar, et al.,
August 2015). In addition they find that when an unrelated CAM is disclosed under precise
standards jurors question the quality of the audit and the auditor’s intent to take the
necessary actions to prevent accounting misstatement (Gimbar, et al., August 2015). Thus,
both related and unrelated CAMs are increasing auditor liability in the same way that
imprecise standards do, even when they are applied under precise standards (Gimbar, et al.,
August 2015). They argue that the results of this experiment could lead auditors to increase
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the amount of audit work given the higher litigation risk, and could subsequently increase
audit fees (Gimbar, et al., August 2015).
Gutierrez, Minutti-Meza, Tatum, and Vulcheva examine changes in audit fees, audit
quality, and investors’ reaction to the expanded auditor’s report (Gutierrez, et al., 2016). As
for audit fee changes, they find mixed results ranging from an increase of nearly four percent
to no change in the post-ISA 700 period, depending on the specificity of the model
(Gutierrez, et al., 2016). As for audit quality, they do not find evidence of change. The most
striking change they identify is the length of the audit report, which triples on average from
757 words to 2,400 words (Gutierrez, et al., 2016). They also note a decrease in the
incidence of including internal control issues as a risk (Gutierrez, et al., 2016). Finally for
investor reaction they find little change, possibly because the additional information may not
be strictly new to investors, as they may already be using other information sources (such as
management discussions, financial analyst reports, and audit committee reports) to gather
the same information, or they may infer certain risks based upon observable characteristics
of the company, such as size or presence of intangible assets including goodwill (Gutierrez,
et al., 2016). They also find in their descriptive statistics that the public release of the annual
report is generally not a significant source of new information for investors, either before or
after the introduction of the expanded auditor’s report (Gutierrez, et al., 2016).
In conclusion, the existing research has yielded mixed results on the benefits of the
expanded auditor’s report. I chose to evaluate how informative the expanded report is by
comparing those matters that the auditor is now reporting to matters that management
already reports. In the next section, I define my research question and explain my
procedure.
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V. Research Question: Does the Expanded Report Provide New Information?

Using annual reports from four companies in the UK, I examine whether the
expanded auditor report is reporting the same risks and critical audit matters that
management has already been reporting. Thus, investors will be receiving the same
information in two different places. One implication of reporting the same information is
that the expanded auditor report is not as valuable because it is not adding new information.
One limitation is in determining whether new information added by the auditor encourages
management to also mention the issue, which also makes it difficult to measure the value of
the expanded report.
To examine this hypothesis, I acquired annual reports from four major grocery
chains (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Marks and Spencer, and Morrison’s) in the UK for the years 2010
to 2016. I specifically chose these firms because they are the only grocery chains in the UK
that are publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange and primarily based in the UK. One
other chain, Ocado, is also traded on the London Stock Exchange, but it is an online-only
supermarket, which would make it difficult to compare to the others. I chose companies
that are in the same industry because they are likely to be reporting the same or similar risks
and critical matters from year to year. Thus, investors are likely to know these risks already.
I chose the time range to have a sample of reports before ISA 700 (from 2010 through 2013)
and after ISA 700 (from 2014 through 2016).
I went through all of the reports manually and coded the risks into three categories:
(1) those reported only by management, (2) those reported only by the external auditor, and
(3) those reported by both management and the external auditor. For those years prior to
ISA 700 when the risks were not as easily located in the report, I typically found them
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disclosed in the audit committee report or the note to the financial statements that describes
“areas of significant judgment.” My conclusion is that items that fall into category three are
essentially redundant – the investor is gaining the information in two different places, and he
or she was likely already aware of the risk from last year’s report if management was
reporting it then.
The evidence is clear that in the post-ISA 700 period, many items that were
previously reported only by management are now being reported by both management and
the external auditor. In the section that follows I will highlight some of these items and the
trends I found in the data.

VI. Results

The CAMs that I highlight below are those that three or four of the companies
consistently reported from year to year. Table 1 lists the external auditor for each company
for each year in the analysis. One limitation of my analysis is that PwC is the external
auditor for each of the companies at one time or another. Examples of auditor’s reports in
both the pre-ISA 700 period and the post-ISA 700 period can be found in Appendix A and
Appendix B, respectively.

Capitalization and impairment of tangible and intangible assets
As shown in Table 2, all four firms reported capitalization and impairment of
tangible and intangible assets as a critical matter.2 Management at three of the firms – Marks
and Spencer (M&S), Sainsbury’s, and Tesco – reported it from 2010-2016. From 2014-2016
2

In some reports it was referred to simply as depreciation or amortization.
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(the post-ISA 700 period) all four firms fell into category three – that both management and
the external auditor were reporting the matter. For three firms, this is a great example of
redundancy in the expanded auditor’s report. Not only were three out of the four firms
reporting this risk in the pre-ISA 700 period, but also by the time the expanded auditor’s
report was in place management and the external auditor were including it.
Interestingly, Morrison’s was using a different external auditor (KPMG) than the
other three companies (all of whom used PwC) in 2014, the year in which management and
the external auditor across all four firms began including the risk. In the case of the three
companies whose management was reporting it in the pre-ISA 700 period, one could infer
that PwC possibly picked up this CAM from management. Yet for Morrison’s, it is unclear
whether the inclusion of the CAM was a result of management influencing the auditors or
the auditors influencing management (or neither).
[Insert Table 2]

Post-retirement benefits and pension valuation
As shown in Table 3, the four companies follow a similar pattern with reporting
post-retirement benefits and pension valuation as a critical matter, again with the exception
of Morrison’s. The managements of all four companies reported post-retirement benefits
and pension valuation as a risk from 2010-2013 (the pre-ISA 700 period). In 2014,
Morrison’s management discontinues reporting the matter. However, the managements of
the remaining three firms continue to report the matter from 2014-2016 (the post-ISA 700
period). The external auditors for M&S and Sainsbury’s also reported the matter as a CAM
in 2015 and 2016, and the external auditor for Tesco followed suit in 2016. Again, these are
examples of redundancy between what management and the external auditor are reporting.
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[Insert Table 3]

Internal control and risk management
As shown in Table 4, internal control and risk management is an example of a critical
matter that only began appearing in the auditor’s report in the post-ISA 700 period.
However, it follows a non-uniform pattern.
In 2014, all four companies are reporting the matter somewhere. Only Morrison’s
management reports it, whereas only the external auditors for the other three companies
report it. In 2015, the external auditors for Sainsbury’s and Tesco report the matter.
Morrison’s and M&S do not report it at all. In 2015 M&S changed external auditors to
Deloitte, which could explain why this matter disappears. In 2016, management at
Morrison’s reports the matter again and the external auditor for Tesco reports it. Sainsbury’s
and M&S do not report it at all. Interestingly, Tesco switched external auditors to Deloitte
in 2016 and it continued being listed as a CAM, yet it was not for M&S in 2015. In 2016
Sainsbury’s changed external auditors from PwC to EY, which could explain why this matter
disappears.
This appears to be a critical matter that both management and external auditors are
unsure of year to year. It is inconsistent, yet apparently still relevant, so it will be interesting
to see how this issue plays out in years to come. It also raises the question of whether the
choice of external auditor influences what key audit matters get reported, not only by the
external auditor but also by management.
Also, this non-uniform pattern made me notice another unusual pattern related to
Morrison’s. Morrison’s never has any risks that fall into category 2 – those items reported
only by the external auditor. For Morrison’s, either management reports on something or
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both management and the external auditor report on it. For three out of the four risks that
Morrison’s external auditor includes in 2014, that is also the first year that management
includes them. This suggests once more that items reported by the external auditor
influence items reported by management.
[Insert Table 4]

Revenue recognition – refunds, loyalty schemes, and returns
As shown in table 5, the trend for reporting revenue recognition, including refunds,
loyalty schemes, and returns, as a critical matter is not as obvious as those previously
mentioned. The patterns indicate that not all external auditors view this as a key audit matter
each year, and management seems split on the issue as well. However, for firms who report
this risk (all except Morrison’s) either the external auditor is solely reporting this item or
both management and the external auditor are reporting it by 2016.
Marks and Spencer has the simplest pattern, in that management reports the matter
from 2010-2013, and both management and the external auditor report it from 2014-2016.
Sainsbury’s is more complicated. Management only reports the matter in 2013. The
external auditor, PwC, reports it in 2014, does not report it in 2015, and then their new
external auditor, EY, reports it in 2016.
Tesco’s management did not report the matter prior to 2015. In 2014 the external
auditor included it as a CAM, and in 2015 and 2016 both management and the external
auditor highlighted it.
Again, these observations support the idea that items reported by the external
auditor often become items reported by management in subsequent years, and the choice of
auditor can have an impact on what matters are included as CAMs.
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[Insert Table 5]

Useful life, residual value, carrying value of PPE
Reporting useful life, residual value, or carrying value of property, plant, and
equipment (PPE) as a critical matter stood out to me because it appeared in annual reports
of three of the four companies (all but Tesco), yet it was never included as a CAM by the
external auditor. As shown in Table 6, Marks and Spencer reported it from 2010-2016;
Morrison’s reported it from 2010-2013; and Sainsbury’s only reported it in 2016. This
suggests that there are instances where management reports something that they feel is of
high importance, regardless of whether the external auditor chooses to report it as well.
[Insert Table 6]

IT infrastructure and data security
The matter of IT infrastructure and data security is interesting because the reporting
patterns vary a substantial amount from firm to firm. As shown in Table 7, all firms except
Marks and Spencer included it.
Sainsbury’s management reported it from 2012-2015, and the external auditor
reported it in 2015 and 2016. It’s interesting that they overlap only in 2015 and that even
though management reported it for so many consecutive years, only the external auditor
reports it in 2016. This could lend credence to the idea that CAMs reported by the external
auditor are more credible than those reported by management, which could cause
management to cease including it.
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Another interesting pattern is that Tesco’s external auditor includes it in 2016, which
is the first time users see it in Tesco’s report. On the opposite end of the spectrum,
Morrison’s management reports it from 2014-2016, yet the external auditor never includes it.
These three patterns are difficult to reconcile and compare to draw conclusions.
[Insert Table 7]

Other trends
Some of the risks included in the reports appeared in fewer than three of the firms,
but trends are apparent and worth mentioning.
First, Morrison’s and Tesco have the same pattern for onerous lease provisions and
onerous property commitments, wherein management reports it from 2010-2013 (pre-ISA
700) and both management and the external auditor report it 2014-2016 (post-ISA 700).
Second, management and the external auditor specifically include inventory valuation
for both Marks and Spencer (2014-2016) and Tesco (2015-2016).
Finally, Marks and Spencer and Sainsbury’s have similar patterns for supply chain
and supplier income accounting. Sainsbury’s external auditor includes the risk in 2014, and
then both management and the external auditor include it in 2015 and 2016. Marks and
Spencer exhibits the same reporting pattern in 2015 and 2016.

VII. Discussion and Conclusion
As I have indicated in a number of examples, management and the external auditors
are frequently identifying the same risks, particularly by 2016 after ISA 700 has been in place
for three years. This suggests that there is little added value in the expanded auditor’s report
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if users are acquiring the same information in two different locations. However, it also may
suggest that what the auditor reports influences what management reports, and this is where
the value may be added in that management is essentially being encouraged to report the
most important matters to investors and other financial statement users. Further, there is
something to be said for auditor credibility and the fact that perception of auditor
independence is enhanced when auditors agree with management when giving an unqualified
opinion (Doxey 2014).
This finding is important for the PCAOB to be aware of as they consider whether or
not to adopt the standard for an expanded auditor’s report. They must consider the costs of
implementing the change if the benefits are small. So far there is not evidence in the UK
that expanding the auditor’s report causes audit fees to increase. In fact, auditors are already
in the practice of charging higher audit fees to those clients they identify as having more
risks of material misstatement (Lennox, et al., 2016).
Further research about the effect of switching auditors on the CAMs reported by
management would be useful for the PCAOB in deciding whether to expand the auditor’s
report. From the limited data that I’ve compiled, it is difficult to discern major trends in this
area or to draw conclusions about the level of impact an external auditor has on
management’s reporting choices.
It is unclear if and when the PCAOB will vote on the new standard. On December
23, 2016 one board member, Jay D. Hanson, resigned from the board, making a consensus
on the vote perhaps more difficult to achieve (Hood 2016). Also, James Doty has already
exceeded his term limit as chairman of the board, and the new Trump administration could
appoint someone else before the PCAOB has a chance to vote (Rapoport 2016).
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A major improvement in the expanded report is definitely in the ease of reading
exactly which matters the auditor identifies as critical to the audit. Like the investors
surveyed by the FRC, I too can attest to the fact that the signposting and diagrams are useful
in understanding the content of the auditor’s report, which supports Smith’s finding that
readability has increased. However, my analysis still shows that management consistently
reports many of those same matters, so the question of added value remains.
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Exhibit 1: PCAOB Proposal Timeline
Date
June 21, 2011

Description
Concept Release

August 13, 2013

Proposed Rule

May 11, 2016

Reproposed Rule

Main Points
Discussion of alternatives3 for changing the auditor’s reporting
model:
1. A supplement to the auditor’s report in which the
auditor would be required to provide additional
information about the audit and the company’s
financial statements (“Auditor’s Discussion and
Analysis”)
2. Required and expanded use of emphasis paragraphs in
the auditor’s report
3. Auditor reporting on information outside the financial
statements (e.g., non-GAAP information and earnings
releases)
4. Clarification of certain language in the auditor’s report
(e.g., reasonable assurance and auditor independence)
Three significant changes to the existing auditor’s report:
1. Auditor reporting of critical audit matters.4
2. Add new elements related to auditor independence,
auditor tenure, and the auditor’s responsibility for
other information in annual reports containing the
audited financial statements and the related auditor’s
report
3. Enhance certain standardized language in the auditor's
report, including the addition of the phrase "whether
due to error or fraud"5 and the ability to include
explanatory paragraphs
Retains pass/fail model, but adds significant changes
1. Determination, communication, and documentation of
critical audit matters6
2. Clarification of existing auditor’s responsibilities (e.g.,
independence, tenure, addressee)
3. Adding explanatory language and emphasis paragraphs
4. Including information about certain audit participants
(e.g., engagement partners and other accounting firms
that participate in the audit)
5. Clarifying the form of the auditor’s report

A revised auditor’s report could include one or a combination of these alternatives, elements within the
alternatives or alternatives not currently presented in this concept release.
4 Defined as those matters addressed during the audit that (1) involved the most difficult, subjective, or
complex auditor judgments; (2) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate
evidence; or (3) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in forming the opinion on the financial statements.
5 This phrase is used when describing the auditor's responsibility under PCAOB standards to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, whether due to error or
fraud.
6 Defined as those matters that (1) were communicated or required to be communicated to the audit
committee; (2) relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements; and (3) involved
especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.
3
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Table 1: External Auditor by Year

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco

2010
PwC
KPMG
PwC
PwC

2011
PwC
KPMG
PwC
PwC

2012
PwC
KPMG
PwC
PwC

Key
PwC
KPMG
Deloitte
EY

PricewaterhouseCoopers
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
formerly Ernst and Young
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2013
PwC
KPMG
PwC
PwC

2014
PwC
KPMG
PwC
PwC

2015
Deloitte
PwC
PwC
PwC

2016
Deloitte
PwC
E&Y
Deloitte

Table 2: Capitalization and impairment of tangible and intangible assets
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco
Key
Reported by management
Reported by external auditor
Reported by both
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting
capitalization and impairment of tangible and intangible assets as a key audit matter. Blank
(white) boxes indicate that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key
audit matter. Years 2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016
include expanded auditor’s reports.
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Table 3: Post-retirement benefits and pension valuation
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco
Key
Reported by management
Reported by external auditor
Reported by both
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting postretirement benefits and pension valuation as a key audit matter. Blank (white) boxes indicate
that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key audit matter. Years
2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 include expanded
auditor’s reports.
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Table 4: Internal control and risk management
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco
Key
Reported by management
Reported by external auditor
Reported by both
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting
internal control and risk management as a key audit matter. Blank (white) boxes indicate
that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key audit matter. Years
2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 include expanded
auditor’s reports.
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Table 5: Revenue recognition – refunds, loyalty schemes, and returns
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco
Key
Reported by management
Reported by external auditor
Reported by both
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting
revenue recognition, including refunds, loyalty schemes, and returns, as a key audit matter.
Blank (white) boxes indicate that neither management nor the external auditor identified it as
a key audit matter. Years 2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016
include expanded auditor’s reports.
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Table 6: Useful life, residual value, carrying value of PPE
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco
Key
Reported by management
Reported by external auditor
Reported by both
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting useful
life, residual value, and/or carrying value of property, plant and equipment (PPE) as a key
audit matter. Blank (white) boxes indicate that neither management nor the external auditor
identified it as a key audit matter. Years 2010-2013 include reports prior to the expansion;
years 2014-2016 include expanded auditor’s reports.
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Table 7: IT infrastructure and data security
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Marks and Spencer
Morrison's
Sainsbury's
Tesco
Key
Reported by management
Reported by external auditor
Reported by both
This table indicates whether management, the external auditor, or both were reporting IT
infrastructure and data security as a key audit matter. Blank (white) boxes indicate that
neither management nor the external auditor identified it as a key audit matter. Years 20102013 include reports prior to the expansion; years 2014-2016 include expanded auditor’s
reports.
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Appendix A: 2009 Auditors’ Report – Tesco (Pre-ISA 700)
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Appendix B: 2016 Auditors’ Report – Tesco (Post-ISA 700)
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